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A JUDGE'S reluctance to speak in public comes from the fear of
saying too much or too little. He may say too much if he speaks
on live issues or refers to live judges. In avoiding this danger he runs the
risk of indulging in cryptic and sometimes vapid generalities. I shall try
to thread my way between saying too much and too little on a subject of
special interest now-the frictionmaking, exacerbating political role of
federal courts.1 This is the federal courts' destined role of bringing local
policy in line with national policy. The role is properly described as
"political" because federal courts, although operating only within the
framework of "cases or controversies", adjust the body politic to stresses
and strains produced by conflicts (1) between the nation and the states
and (2) between the states and private citizens asserting federally-created
or federally-protected rights In the second area of conflicts the courts'
role is not just to safeguard individual personal rights. The basic political
rights of a large group, an entire race,' may be affected.
These stresses and strains are peculiar to our unique form of govern-
* Adapted from a speech presented before the Second Annual Robert G. Storey Lecture at
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B., Washington and Lee University; LL.B., Tulane University; LL.D., Oberlin University.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
'A great deal has been written about the Supreme Court, but until recently very little about
the role of inferior federal courts. However, see especially PELTASON, FIPTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN:
SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS
IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1955); Vines, Courts and Political Change in the South, 22 J. Soc.
ISSUES 59 (1966); Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 26 J.
POLITICS 337 (1964); Vines, The Role of Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial Process:
A Case Study, 7 MIDWEST J. POL. SCi. 305 (1963). See Goldman, Characteristics of Eisenhower
and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts, 18 WESTERN POL. Q. 755 (1963); Hamilton,
Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The Judicial Approach to the Solution of Controversial
Social Problems, 1965 WIs. L. REV. 72; Loeb, Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Civil Liberties
Cases Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 146 (1965); Murphy & Birkley, Interest Group Conflict in the
Judicial Arena: The First Amendment and Group Access to the Courts, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 1018
(1964); Spicer, The Federal Judiciary and Political Change in the South, 26 J. POLITICS 154 (1964);
Steamer, The Role of the Federal District Courts in the Segregation Controversy, 22 J. POLITICS
417 (1960); Sutherland, The American Judiciary and Racial Desegregation, 20 MODERN L. REV.
201 (1957). See generally MURPHY & PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS (1961); Jacobs,
The Courts as Political Agencies, 8 TUL. STUDIES IN POL. SCI. 9 (1963). See also Barker, Third
Parties in Litigation: A Systematic View of the Judicial Function, 29 J. POLITICS 41 (1967);
Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The Judicial Approach to the Solution of
Controversial Social Problems, 1965 WIs. L. REV. 72; Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal
Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (1963); Moore, Problems of the
Federal Judiciary, 35 F.R.D. 305 (1964); Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Viola-
tions, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 532 (1961); Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox,
52 A.B.A.J. 742 (1966); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administra-
tion, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 949 (1964); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963).
'Freund, The Federal Judiciary, in STUDIES IN FEDERALISM 106 (Bowie & Friedrich ed.
1954); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
'Sutherland, The American Judiciary and Racial Desegregation, 20 MODERN L. REV. 201
(1957).
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ment. They occur because, unlike other federalisms, in the American
system states are neither administrative units of a national government
nor sovereign members of a federated league. They are indestructible
political entities having their own law, own authority, and own system of
courts, but subordinate to the federal sovereignty in all matters of na-
tional concern. However, conflicts between the nation and the states should
not be over-emphasized. The pragmatic necessity for federal legal suprem-
acy when tensions strain the federal structure tends to obscure the grow-
ing importance of the states as partners with the nation in common ven-
tures. Our system is not just a federal system-it is a cooperative federal
system.4
I.
The increasing importance of the political function of federal courts
is not caused, to any great extent, by activistic tendencies on the part of
some federal judges to intrude into state affairs.5 In my humble but con-
sidered judgment, events beyond the control of judges have thrust the
federal courts into a larger and more active political role than their prede-
cessors played-but not a role unanticipated by the authors of the Con-
stitution.
In 1928 Congress was debating the Norris-LaGuardia bill to curb the
federal courts' use of injunctions in labor disputesE At that time Congress
feared that federal courts were over-protective of property interests at
the expense of labor. The "balance-wheel" 7 was off-center. The bill pro-
voked long debates in Congress and extended discussion throughout the
country on the proper purposes and powers of federal courts.
In the same year Mr. Justice Frankfurter, then teaching at Harvard
Law School, wrote a memorable article, The Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts.! He was disturbed by the
extension of federal authority that had taken place in the years between
1900 and 1928. Pointing both to the past and to the future, he wrote:
Whatever our [political] preferences, the complexities and interdependence
of modern society are bound to throw upon the federal courts increasing
burdens of litigation affecting federal rights .... Whether national responsi-
4 Mason, A Critique of Cooperative Federalism, in REP. OF NAT'L CONE. ON GOV'T (1960).
See ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES: RIVALS OR PARTNERS? (1955); ELAZER, THE
AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP, INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(1962); SADY, RESEARCH IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS: A REPORT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AND PROBLEMS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY (Brookings Inst. 1957).
There is, as everyone knows, a large volume of literature to the contrary. To take just one
recent example by a distinguished authority, see McCloskey, Reflections on the Warren Court, 51
VA. L. REV. 1229 (1965). Professor McCloskey concludes that "Only the Courts of the 1920-1936
era can be even approximately compared with the Warren Court in its will-to-govern, its activism."
Id. at 1247.
'Senator Norris' bill, S. 3151, which became the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1952), had just been favorably reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Rep. No. 626,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928). See Frankfurter & Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation,
42 HARV. L. REV. 766 (1929); ABA Comm. on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, Memorandum in
Opposition, 69 CONG. REC. 8439 (1928).
'This was Woodrow Wilson's favorite term for describing the function of federal courts.
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 142-43 (1961).813 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928).
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bility or state rights were the accent in speech, the administrations of Theo-
dore Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson and Coolidge alike have contributed heavily
to the growth of federal authority. This has had its reflex in federal litigation.
The process will not stop.'
In the forty years since then, we have had the administrations of an-
other Roosevelt and four other aggressive presidents. Dramatic slogans tell
the story: the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the Great Crusade, the New
Frontier, and now the Great Society. Expanding federal litigation in both
old and new fields of endeavor and the resulting expansion of federal
authority have accelerated at a pace that would have left Taft, Wilson,
Harding, and Coolidge panting for breath. Congress has just completed
another great debate over federal-state relations. We stand in a brief
hiatus between adoption and effective enforcement of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964." This statute will have a far, far greater effect on the
federal system, particularly on the role of federal courts, than the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. It is timely to echo Justice Frankfurter's words in 1928,
"Nothing but good can come from a re-examination of the purposes to
be served by the federal courts.""
I have some figures to illustrate what has happened in our court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At the time Frank-
furter wrote, forty years ago, 240 appeals were filed in our court. Twenty-
five years later, in the 1953-1954 term, the number had more than
doubled. By 1964, the number again had doubled. In our current term
we have more than 1,000 regularly docketed filings and another 1,000
so-called administrative filings. In 1928 four circuit judges handled the
Fifth Circuit appeals; last year Congress approved a total of thirteen
circuit judges for our court, making our court, by four judges, the largest
federal court in the United States.
The relatively heavy increase in diversity litigation in the Fifth Circuit
is a result of the enormous industrial expansion and increase in popula-
tion in Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, and, to a lesser extent, in
Alabama and Mississippi. The increase in federal question litigation and
the resulting extension of federal judicial authority, in our circuit as in all
circuits, has two fundamental causes: first, the irresistible momentum of
historical events, world-wide in importance, driving this country toward
a strong national government; secondly, paradoxically but inevitably in
a society that cherishes individual self-determination, the movement away
from government controls toward increased recognition by federal courts
of the rights of individuals, especially the rights under the first eight
amendments and the Civil War amendments. Similar movements do not
coexist in most countries. Their coexistence in this country is something
like Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson sharing an apartment
happily together.
I Ibid.
"OPub. L. No. 88-352, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-1106 (July 2, 1964); 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-2000h-6 (1965). See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966), aff'd and decree modified in rehearing en banc, No. 23345, 5th Cir., March 29, 1967.
11 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 530 (1928).
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The Great Depression of the thirties, World War II, the Korean War
and now another war, the rising peril from Russian and Chinese commu-
nism, the harnessing of atomic energy, Negro enfranchisement, the civil
rights explosion, the growing congressional recognition of the nation's
interest in education, health and welfare, the national importance of the
development of automation and electronics, the mobility of modern life,
miracles in transportation and communication, megalopolis, the reach for
the stars, these and many other powerful influences-not the grasp for
power Lord Acton feared and not the activism of federal judges-have
shaped the national government into a strong central government. But
this has always been in the cards-always since the Constitutional Con-
vention, discarding the notion of a league of sovereign states, "converted
their congress of ambassadors . . . into a legislature,"'" and approved the
supremacy clause. 3 The James Madison of the Constitutional Convention"'
and the Federalist Papers" (but not some of the other Madisons), the
Alexander Hamilton of the Federalist Papers," Secretary of the Treasury,'
and first ghost writer to a president," the Thomas Jefferson of the Louisiana
Purchase" (but not some of the other Jeffersons), and, of course, John
Marshall of McCulloch v. Maryland" and many other decisions all saw the
direction if not the shaping of events when they constructed the Consti-
tution or construed it so as to "anticipate America.""
This country lives and thrives and enjoys Jeffersonian freedoms and
rights under what is primarily a Hamiltonian view of constitutional gov-
" Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 114 (1824).
13 Article II of the Articles of Confederation expressed this conception of a league of sovereign
states: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction
and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled." But article VI, clause 2, the supremacy clause of the Constitution, states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
14 Madison went very far indeed. In his journal of the federal convention, he reported that he
seconded the motion giving the national legislature a negative on such state laws which might be
contrary to the Articles of the Union. 1 FERRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, 164 (1911).
'
5See especially THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (Madison).
'6 See especially THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 23, 33, 78 (Hamilton).
'7 See his Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National Bank, February 23, 1791 in 3 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445-95 (Lodge ed. 1904); Reports on Manufactures, id. vol.
4, at 151.
"Hamilton's preliminary outline and major draft of George Washington's Farewell Address is
in 28 Hamilton Papers, 3948-50, 3951-62 (Library of Congress). See WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL
ADDRESS IN FACSIMILE (Paltsits ed. 1935); BINNEY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE FORMATION OF
WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS 250 (1859); 2 MITCHELL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE
NATIONAL ADVENTURE 1788-1804, 388 (1962).
"' In his Third Annual Message to Congress, October 17, 1803, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 351 (Lipscomb ed. 1905), Jefferson exhorted Congress on the value and necessity of
this acquisition. See 2 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRA-
TIONS OF JEFFERSON AND MADISON 77-81 (1889); PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE
AMERICAN MIND 266-76 (1960).
""Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
'" The phrase is Richard B. Morris'. MORRIS, THE BASIC IDEAS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
xix (1957).
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ernment.2 This view rejects as archaic and unrealistic the maxim that
"the least government is the best government" and favors a strong, more
perfect Union under a Constitution, that "ought to be construed liberally
in advancement of the public good. '' " Yet there has never been a time
when the individual citizen enjoyed more meaningfully liberty, equality
before the law, first amendment rights, freedom from abuses of the gov-
ernmental process-the "unalienable" rights of man before the altar of
which Jefferson dedicated his life.
The development of a strong national government adequate to the
exigencies of the times and to the complexities of administering a great
modern nation is not necessarily inconsistent with the vitality of the
states as members of the federal union. ' The notion that state govern-
ments have a less significant role to play in the lives of the American
people than they once had is a myth." The expansion of the functional
responsibility of the nation in furnishing services to its people has en-
couraged the states and political subdivisions to increase their functional
responsibility and activities-in education, health, welfare, roads and high-
ways, law enforcement, hospitals, and other state- and county-operated
services." If we take debt as a measure of activity (and, of course, debt is
only one criterion) from 1950 through 1964 federal debt increased 22
per cent; state and local debt increased 305 per cent." Total state govern-
ment expenditures for the services traditionally performed by states now
exceed federal expenditures for domestic programs."
22 This is the thesis of Professor Clinton Rossiter in ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND
THE CONSTITUTION 11, 236-37 (1964).
223 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 455 (Lodge ed. 1904).
24 This calls for a division of the question. Strong governors and legislatures are characteristic of
some states. In others, as James Reston has said, "The state capitals are over their heads in problems
and up to their knees in midgets." Quoted by Eric Goldman in replying to Russell Kirk, Is Wash-
ington Too Powerful?, The New York Times Magazine, March 1, 1964, p. 22, 84.
25 Belser, Robert E. Smylie in the Circle, reprinted from Washington World, April 1966, in 112
CONG. REC. A-2035 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1966). Many highly respected political scientists agree with
Governor Smylie. Professor William Anderson quoted in THE PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM: A SuR-
VEY IN FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 26 (Macmahon ed. 1955); MARTIN, THE CITIES
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 188 (1965); MOSHER & POLAND, THE COSTS OF AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENTS: FACTS, TRENDS, MYTHS 48 (1964); Campbell, Most Dynamic Sector, 53 NATIONAL
CIVIC REV. 74 (1964).
I State expenditures have increased in these areas from 1946 to 1961 in the following per-
centages: Education, 513 per cent; Health, 135 per cent; Welfare, 235 per cent; Highways, 488
per cent; Police, 321 per cent; Hospitals, 518 per cent. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1963 STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 422 (84th ed. 1963); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES to 1957, at 727 (Series Y
547-74, 1960). See also MOSHER, RECENT TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN THE
UNITED STATES 33 (1961).
27 1963 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, op. cit. supra note 26, at 388, 422; HISTORICAL STATISTICS,
op. cit. supra note 26, series Y 536-46, at 726.
2' From 1902 to 1962 the federal government's general revenues increased 141 times,
the general revenues of local governments 45 times. During the same period the gen-
eral revenues of the states multiplied 164 times. If taxes alone are considered, the
growth figures are as follows: for the federal government, 126 times; for local
governments, 33 times; for the states, 132 times. . . . Whether computed in terms
of general revenues or in terms of taxes alone, the revenue growth rate of state gov-
ernment over six decades is greater than that of either of the other levels. . . . If,
however, war and war-related costs are excluded and the figures are limited to domes-
tic expenditures, then the direct expenditures of state governments grew more rapidly
from 1902 to 1962 than those of either the national government or the communi-
ties.
MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 186 (1965).
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Although a strong central government means more congressional legis-
lation, more federal administrative agencies, and more federal question
cases in federal courts, it has not necessarily meant that federal courts are
increasingly intruding in state affairs. As many authorities on constitu-
tional law have repeatedly pointed out, contrary to the legal situation
as it existed thirty years ago, in economic and social regulation,"' taxation,'
and other vast areas of governmental activity the states are virtually free
from federal judicial interference." Not in thirty years has a state economic
regulation been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court for lack of
substantive due process." Again, notwithstanding the breadth of the
commerce clause, the Supreme Court has allowed wide latitude to the
states in taxation of interstate commerce,"3 multiple-state taxation,'4 high-
way regulation," and many other matters. What is more, the Supreme
Court has protected state power from the encroachment of congressional
action.' This means of course that state legislatures enjoy a freedom from
federal controls and Supreme Court interference that our laissez faire-
oriented fathers and grandfathers would have regarded as dangerous to
the free enterprise system.
Erie v. Tompkins' now competes against a growing federal common
law. But Erie is a constant reminder to federal courts not to trespass on
the domain of state courts. Whatever else it does, Erie makes for healthy
federalism." Similarly, the development of the abstention doctrine and
" See discussion of cooperative federalism in economic and social regulation in FREUND, THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 22-23 (1961).
"See Barrett, "Substance" Versus "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State
Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 740 (1953); Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-
"Direct Burdens," ".Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496 (1951); Brown,
The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219
(1957); Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARV. L. REv. 949
(1941); Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business,
75 HARV. L. REV. 953 (1962).
a We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,' and we
emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause
Ito strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.'
Justice Black in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1962) (Quoting from Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955)).
"2 See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1958); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 34; Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear
-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VANO. L. REV. 446 (1951).
"E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Railway Express Agency
v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1958); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
'4Compare Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936); Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325
(1920).
asSee Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); but cf., Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957). See also HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 42-46 (1958).
'See Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935); BLACK, PERS'ECTIVES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (1963).
a"Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
' See Cole, Erie v. Tompkins and the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 36 AM.
POL. Scl. REV. 885 (1942); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
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inter-jurisdictional certification promotes federal deference to states'
rights.
3 9
The reapportionment cases cut both ways. It is true that in the past
state legislatures have been solely responsible for apportionment of repre-
sentation. They could and did consider geography, county lines, rural
checks on urban powers, and other factors militating against the principle
of one man, one vote. But it is also true that federal courts, especially the
inferior courts, have moved slowly in this field and have acted only as
a last resort, when legislatures failed to act. And it is also true that in
the past cities and suburban areas have been so under-represented in some
state legislatures that a strong tendency has developed toward direct
federal-municipal dealings that bypass state governments, thereby under-
mining effective state administration.4 Fair apportionment will lead to
more responsible state legislatures.4' In the long run, this now unwanted
intrusion of federal courts into state affairs will strengthen the states and
their local communities vis-a-vis the federal government.42 There will be
less need for city officials to run to Washington for help. And state legis-
latures will be more responsive to urban and suburban needs.
Horizontal headshaking, and sometimes stronger criticisms, by con-
firmed segregationists may be ignored. But contemporary criticism of the
Supreme Court and other federal courts also comes from responsible critics
-not to speak of dissenting justices. In 1958 the Tenth Conference of
State Chief Justices concluded that "the Supreme Court too often has
tended to adopt the role of policy-maker without proper judicial re-
straint."' Only three years earlier, however, President Eisenhower's Com-
REV. 489 (1954); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 541
(1958); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine ilk Diversity
Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957).
"' Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine,
24 F.R.D. 481 (1960); Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1963). In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207 (1960) Mr. Justice Frankfurter labelled inter-jurisdiction certification under Florida
law as a product of "rare foresight" and suggested that it be used. But see United Serv. Life Ins.
Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855(Tex. 1965), 20 Sw. L.J. 402 (1966), showing aversion by the
Texas Supreme Court to abstention. The same case is mentioned in Charmatz, Conflict of Laws,
21 Sw. L.J. 183, 195-96 (1967).
","If states do not give cities their rightful allocation of seats in the legislature, the tendency
will be toward direct federal-municipal dealings." COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS 39-40 (1955). Some see the American
federal system as developing into a three-level system with the cities a third partner. They point
to the explicit recognition of the problems of housing, transit, pollution, and a vast number of
other metropolitan problems as national problems. MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM,
THE EXPANDED PARTNERSHIP: APPRAISAL 175 (1965).
41 See McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 36-40
(1965).
' Many state legislatures do not share this view. As of the time this Article goes to press, thirty-
two of the required thirty-four states have called for a constitutional convention to reverse--or at
least modify as to one house-the one man, one vote standard for apportionment.
" The report specifically criticized the Supreme Court's reliance upon the general welfare
clause in upholding the Social Security Act, questioned the broad application of the doctrine of
preemption in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), and questioned the partial application
of the doctrine in labor relations cases. The report applauded the Supreme Court's "more liberal
view in recent years toward the validity of state taxation" and concluded that in fourteenth amend-
ment cases, especially those involving the state administration of criminal justice, "1the Supreme
Court too often has tended to adopt the role of policy-maker without proper judicial restraint."
COMM. ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS AS AFFECTED BY JUDICIAL DECISIONS, REPORT (1958).
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mission on Intergovernmental Relations-not exactly a way-out group-
reported that federal limitations on the states arising out of national
powers "have only a minimal effect on the capacity of the States to dis-
charge their functions .... The trend of [federal] judicial opinions out-
side the civil liberties field has on the whole been tolerant and accommo-
dating to state policy."" I subscribe to this view today.
II.
For the most part the friction-making cases in the federal courts are
not those over the allocation of power between the states and the nation.
They are the cases between the states and its citizens involving civil rights
and fair criminal procedures."5 These contests arise from state courts' em-
ploying lower constitutional standards in their criminal procedures than
federal courts employ, or from a state's failure to give effect to consti-
tutionally created or federally guaranteed rights, when these rights con-
flict with state laws and customs. To the extent that federal courts hold
such state action to be unconstitutional, of course they restrict states'
rights. But this is a restriction on the power of the state over citizens as
individuals or as a class. Many of these rights may be described as inherent
in national citizenship. They are rights derived from the Constitution,
particularly the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, and
from the Bill of Rights as it has been brought forward into the due process
and equal protection clauses. Federal decisions upholding these rights
against adverse state action have only an indirect relationship to the alloca-
tion of power between the nation and states, for they act as limitations
on the governmental powers of both the nation and the states." Never-
theless, these are the cases which at this time most obviously test the
plasticity and effectiveness of the federal structure. For purposes of this
Article, I limit my frame of reference, more or less, to civil rights litiga-
tion in the Fifth Circuit. In other times and other regions of the country
comparable strains on the federal systems have occurred and will continue
to occur.
Civil rights cases reflect the customs and mores of the community as
well as the legal philosophy of the individual judges called upon to
It is not generally realized that the report contains no criticism, indeed no mention of the school
segregation cases.
The Conference of State Chief Justices resolved that a committee be appointed "to examine
the allocation of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts" and "make recommendations
for achieving a sound and appropriate distribution of judicial power between the nation and the
states." Subsequent to this action, Chief Justice Warren recommended to the American Law In-
stitute that'it undertake a study toward the same ends. That study is now nearing completion.
" COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT POR TRANS-
MITTAL TO THE CONGRESS 31 (1955).
" Professor William Lockhart has pointed out that, "A high degree of self-restraint here would
be an abdication of the Court's major responsibility." Lockhart, A Response to the Conference of
Stale Chief Justices, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 802, 807-08 (1959).
"[T]o deny to the States the power to impair a fundamental constitutional right is not to
increase federal power, but, rather, to limit the power of both federal and state governments in
favor of safeguarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual." Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion). Since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) twenty-six states have instituted vital reforms in their criminal procedures.
Mason, The Supreme Court and Federalism, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1187, 1202 (1966).
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adjudicate the controversies. This area of conflict therefore is an extremely
sensitive and difficult one in which federal courts must perform their
nationalizing function. This is where localism tends to create wide differ-
ences among our courts. Parochial prides and prejudices and built-in
attachments to local customs must be expected to reduce the incentive of
inferior federal courts to bring local policy in line with national policy.
This in turn produces differences in the respective roles of the Supreme
Court, the circuit courts, and the district courts--depending on the extent
to which the court is capable of establishing policy and the degree of its
insulation from localism.
I do not use the term "localism" with any invidious implication. "The
root conceptions of our federal judicial system were independence and
localism .... An independent judiciary was part of the scheme of counter-
poises in government. . . Moreover, in establishing United States courts
Congress was mindful of state loyalties."47 Federal district judges who
are often reversed in civil rights cases have no intention of flouting the
law and do not lack good faith. They do not consciously yield to local
prejudice at the expense of their philosophy of law and integrity as a
judge. In good part, difficulties in the judicial performance of inferior
federal courts are built into the system. Mandates of the Supreme Court
or of the circuit courts, especially in civil rights cases, often allow a wide
range of choice. Or the state of the law applicable to a given case may
be so uncertain as to permit broad latitude of judicial action. Moreover,
the district judge is personally accountable to the local community and
to the local bar to a much greater degree than an appellate court. He is
unlikely to forge ahead of the Supreme Court or of our court. In these
circumstances, and considering the discretion a district court has anyway,
it is not surprising that in a conservative community a federal judge may
feel that he cannot jeopardize the respect due the court in all of his cases
by appearing to be ahead and to the left of the Supreme Court and our
court in cases involving civil rights and criminal rights which comprise
only a small portion of his docket." It is appropriate, therefore, that the
appellate court bear the brunt of unpopular decisions.
4 7
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 218 (1927).
In a study of the background of district judges sitting in 1963, 51.3 per cent were
born in the district to which they were appointed, 56.1 per cent attended law school
in the state in which the district was located, and 89 per cent had previously held
governmental positions in the same state. The combined effect of this system of selec-
tion has been the recruitment of southern federal judges with good state connections
and local coloration. In no sense of the word have the selectees been federal officials
with alien political values.
Vines, Court and Political Change in the South, 22 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 59, 67 (1966).
" "If large numbers of southerners for reasons just or unjust, come to consider federal judges
to be nothing but 'yankee agents,' even civil rights advocates may lose more than they may gain
from immediate legal victories. These men will not only be lonely, but ostracized." PELTASON,
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN op. cit. supra note 1, at 252. Concerning both district and appellate
judges, Judge John R. Brown has said:
[L]ifetime tenure insulates judges from anxiety over worldly cares for body and
home and family. But it does not protect them from the unconscious urge for the
approbation of their fellow men-and fellow men most often means those of like
interest and backgrounds, business and professional experiences and predilections, and
even prejudices.
Brown, Hail to the Chief: Hutcheson, the Judge, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 145 (1959).
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In the school segregation cases the Supreme Court put the primary re-
sponsibility for action on the school boards and secondary responsibility
on district courts. It has not worked out well. School officials, acting under
compulsion in the first place, are not anxious to initiate or carry through
plans for prompt and adequate desegregation. In the first decade of school
desegregation, school officials and elected officials generally felt that po-
litical necessities required them to build a public record of unwillingness to
desegregate without having exhausted all legal remedies-hence, cere-
monial appeals, repetitive appeals on issues previously decided. For any
substantial departure from past practices-faculty desegregation, for
example-school officials want a court order; most officials simply will
not take voluntary action to desegregate faculties, facilities, or extra-
curricular activities. District courts are also understandably loath to
change local customs without firm mandates from our court. To fill the
vacuum, therefore, the circuit court must step in, often providing very
complete directions to the district judges.
Circuit judges are not more courageous or more enlightened than dis-
trict judges. They are just not on the firing line, not as exposed to built-in
pressures and allegiances, not as tied by birth, education, residence, pro-
fessional experience and other ties to one state and to one section of a
state. And rarely do they have to condemn and enjoin their golfing, fish-
ing, or gin rummy companions. The Supreme Court, almost wholly re-
moved from the local scene, by this criterion has an obligation to lead
or at least point out the logical line of development of the law.
Differences in judicial performance may depend on whether the case
involves civil rights or fair criminal procedures. Many of the "criminal"
cases involving, for example, the denial of counsel to an accused, or a
coerced confession, or the systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries,
come to the federal courts by way of habeas corpus, after a full trial has
been had in state courts, often after appeals to the United States Supreme
Court. In such cases, federal judges are loath to set aside the state convic-
tion, especially when the petitioner's failure to assert his right in a timely
manner may constitute a fatal procedural default under state law. In
the criminal cases lower federal courts are likely to wait for the Supreme
Court to give specific direction in a special fact-situation. For example,
before the Miranda decision4' our court held up a number of cases wait-
ing for enlightenment from the Supreme Court on the scope of the
Escobedo rule requiring counsel during police interrogation.
In civil rights cases, on the other hand, the inferior federal courts
have a greater latitude for action, because the guidelines are not as clearly
marked as are those in the criminal procedure cases. There have been
relatively few school cases to reach the Supreme Court and the general
direction from the Supreme Court that school boards should desegregate
with "all deliberate speed" has allowed a wide variety of action at both
49 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Comment, Custodial Interrogation as a
Tool of Law Enforcement: Miranda v. Arizona and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 21
Sw. L.J. 253 (1967).
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the district court and appellate levels. (Or it did in 1954, and for many
years thereafter. Now time has run out.) On several occasions the Supreme
Court has explained that "all deliberate speed" allowed delays caused by
administrative difficulties, not delays caused by community hostility to
desegregation. But it is no slight task for a school board or district court,'
charged with the responsibility of effecting or supervising a change in
custom, to avoid being affected to some degree by community hostility
or community acceptance of desegregation. It is hoped that the recent
case United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Education5' will provide a
remedy expediting school desegregation. Jefferson recognizes the affirmative
duty imposed on school authorities to integrate-lock, stock, and barrel;
provides a model decree to be used uniformly throughout the circuit; and
holds that HEW guidelines are constitutional, within the scope of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and within the minimum standards the Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit have set for school desegregation.
When, however, in a case involving a federally protected right, a state
statute appears to the court to be unconstitutional or when state actions
appear to be discriminatory, the court's duty is clear: No matter how
popular local law may be or how unpopular federal requirements may be,
federal courts must expect to bear the primary responsibility for protect-
ing the individual. 2 This responsibility is not new. It did not start with
the school segregation cases. It is close to the heart of the American
federal union. It is implicit in the replacement of the Articles of Con-
federation by the Constitution. It was ordained when the Constitutional
Convention approved the supremacy clause. It makes American federalism
workable.
Lower federal courts "had their origin in fears of local hostilities."5
In the 1787 Convention, the Committee of the Whole approved Randolph's
proposal for mandatory federal courts. Pierce Butler and Edward Rutledge,
both of South Carolina, moved for reconsideration. The states, they said,
would not stand for such an encroachment; the state judges would uphold
the federal constitution and laws, subject to review by the Supreme Court.
James Madison disagreed. He argued that "unless inferior federal tribunals
were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many
cases, appeals would be multiplied to an oppressive degree." Besides, "an
appeal would not in many cases be a remedy." In words often quoted,
Madison said:
"O See Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The Judicial Approach to the Solu-
tion of Controversial Social Problems, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 72, 88.
" United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966) aff'd and decree
modified in rehearing en banc, No. 23345, 5th Cit., March 29, 1967.
" See Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (1963).
'sFriendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483, 510 (1928).
Judge (then Mr.) Friendly added that such fears "had only a speculative existence in 1789, and
are still less real today." The real fear was not of state courts so much as of state legislatures.
See, however, Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV.
869 (1931). Frank takes a middle ground. See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial Sys-
tem, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PiOB. 3 (1948).
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What was to be done after improper verdicts, in state tribunals, obtained
under the biased directions of a dependent judge, or the local prejudices of
an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no
purpose. . . . An effective judiciary establishment, commensurate to the
legislative authority, was essential. A government without a proper execu-
tive and judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or
legs to act or move."
Although Rutledge's motion for reconsideration carried, Madison ulti-
mately prevailed by finding an acceptable compromise in "empowering"
Congress to establish inferior courts. But "it is quite clear that the reason
Congress was given such power and presumably the basic reason for the
existence of the federal courts which Congress did establish forthwith,
was the need for national tribunals to enforce the national law in the
teeth of local resistance.""5 So at least Marshall declared."
When the Federalists in the closing hours of John Adams's term, exer-
cised almost to the fullest the constitutional grant of judicial power, federal
courts were presciently entrusted with all litigation "arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States . . . where the matter in dis-
pute shall amount to four hundred dollars." This 1801 law provided for
six circuit courts, in addition to new district courts. A year later, to frus-
trate President Adams' appointment of new judges, Jeffersonian Republi-
cans repealed this "Midnight Judges" law. Seventy-five years later Con-
gress, by the Act of March 3, 1875, again made the federal courts "the
primary and dominant instruments for vindicating rights given by the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States." '
When the object of a lawsuit is to assert federally protected rights
that inhere in national citizenship, the difference in theory between the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution becomes especially signifi-
cant. The Articles were based on a league of friendship, a league of
sovereign states with the national government acting only through the
states. But the Constitution, created by the people-not by the states as
states--operates directly on the individual citizen. Here too, the opening
sentence of the fourteenth amendment becomes meaningful: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." By virtue of this new national citizenship Negroes are no longer
"beings of an inferior race" incapable of citizenship, the Dred Scott article
of faith. Negroes too are part of "the people of the United States."
I see no evidence that the Department of Justice has pushed its way
545 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF T14E FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 159 (1896).
S Lusky, supra note 52, at 1178.
"Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 2 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
57Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 509 (1928).
The force and dangers of parochial attachments, the effectiveness and limitations
of a centralized judiciary administering law over a continent, the dependability of
state courts, the convenience of suitors, shifting economic and political sentiments-
such influences, with varying incidence, have shaped the accommodations of authority
distributed between the national judiciary and the state courts.
Id. at 514.
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into civil rights litigation. On the contrary, it has moved slowly as a
litigant. When it has participated, it has been under specific congressional
authority. In these cases, the federal government acts to protect the rights
of individual citizens rather than to increase national power at the expense
of the states. I feel strongly that the nation is injured when the constitu-
tionally guaranteed or federally created rights of its citizens are invaded
as a result of state law or state custom. Even without specific statutory
authority, the nation should have standing to sue in the federal courts to
protect itself and its citizens against a wrongful governmental invasion
of a state.58
Whether the United States is a party to the suit or not, the district
court's function in the body politic is to stand fast at the pressure points
where state policies or community customs or the local interests of seg-
ments of the people press against national policy. When district courts
falter or fail in this mission, the circuit court must bring the district courts
into line.
I am not suggesting that a court, acting according to its own measure
of justice, may abandon disciplined, reasoned, principled decision-making. 9
The integrity of the judicial process compels the court to respect the
requirements of jurisdiction, case or controversy, standing, ripeness, moot-
ness, stare decisis, and all other time-tested restraints on judicial activism.
Beyond and cutting across these is the natural restraint that comes from a
realization of the magnitude of the problem of balancing important com-
peting federal values: how to preserve the value of federalism in carrying
out national policy while giving effect to the states as indestructible
political bodies; how to achieve this aim while protecting the constitutional
rights of individual citizens and minorities, as a class, against unlawful
invasions from the states and from the central government.
III.
How well have the federal courts fulfilled their role? Looking at it
qualitatively, the district courts and our court too, if I may say so, have
performed better than might have been expected." The South is over the
" The United States has standing when its substantive interests under the commerce clause
or as parens patriae are affected. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); United States v. City of
Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 11-17 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp.
590 (M.D. Ala. 1962); United States v. Knights of Klu Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.
Ala. 1961); United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. La. 1962); United
States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 10 (1962). See also
Dixon, Civil Rights in Transportation and the ICC, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 198, 199 (1962);
Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1964).5 9
"[T]he soul of a government of laws is the judicial function, and that function can only
exist if adjudication is understood by our people generally to be-as it is-the essentially disinter-
ested, rational and deliberate element in our democracy." From an address by Professor Arthur E.
Sutherland, quoted in Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 945, 961 (1964).
"°See Bernhard & Natalie, Between Rights and Remedies, 53 GEo. L.J. 915, 916 (1965);
Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 209 (1964); Gellhorn, A
Decade of Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 UTAH L. REv. 3 (1964); Marshall, The
Courts, in THE MAZES OF MODERN GOVERNMENT 36 (Center for the Study of Democratic In-
stitutions 1964), quoted in Pollak, Ten Years After the Decision, 24 FED. B.J. 123 (1964). On
the first decade of desegregation, see generally, SARRATT, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION (1966);
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (King ed. 1965).
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hump-over the hump of de jure segregation, over the hump in that re-
sponsible southerners accept the principle of desegregation as the law of
the land, over the hump without serious damage to the federal structure.
Looking at it quantitatively, one would have to say that the results
achieved have been modest and the pace slow. Federal courts have erred
more from over-deference to states' rights than by taking an activist posi-
tion. The accomplishment has been substantial in the field of voting rights.
It has been meager in the field of school desegregation. It has been poor
in the field of employment opportunities. It has been non-existent in the
housing field.
As indicated earlier, the major reason for the slow pace is not the
intransigence of southern judges. 1 In civil rights cases the problem of
enforcement is far more difficult than the problem of legislative or judicial
definition. In most of these cases we are concerned with nationally created
rights that are attributes of the national citizenship recognized in the
Civil War amendments, including the neglected thirteenth amendment.
The responsibility for protecting those rights lies with the nation-with
all three of the coordinate branches of government. But until Congress
adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
statutes with teeth, Congress and the executive had not acted affirmatively
to enforce these rights of national citizenship. This left it entirely to the
judiciary, the branch of government least able to carry out enforcement
in a reasonable time and on a national scale. Our only technique of en-
forcement is through the slow process of adversary litigation, circum-
scribed by all the traditional limitations on the judicial process and the
additional limitations peculiar to federal courts. We are circumscribed too
by the variance in views to be expected of fifty judges, individualists with
widely varying backgrounds and legal philosophies. The Negro plaintiffs
in Brown who never attended a desegregated school have a right to feel
cheated. Negroes generally, still wearing the badges of slavery condemned
a hundred years ago, naturally are tempted to air their grievances on the
streets. Notwithstanding, in view of the magnitude of the task, the
massive resistance of the southern states, and the nature of the federal
court system, federal courts in the Fifth Circuit, on the whole, moved
at a faster pace than might have been expected.
Professor Kenneth N. Vines of Tulane University has made valuable
statistical studies of race relations cases from May 1954, the date of the
Brown decision, to October 1963. There were 291 of these cases in the
federal district courts in the eleven former Confederate states."' In spite
of the widespread opinion that federal courts have favored Negro litigants,
1 Professor Hamilton concluded that, "Although certain federal judges in the South have been
very unsympathetic toward the rights of Negroes, as a general rule it must be conceded that most
of the southern district judges have done a good job of enforcing the rights of Negroes." 1965
Wis. L. REv. 72.
6' See Vines, Federal District judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 26 J. PoLrrics 337
(1964). The statistics are based on the race relations law reporter's definition of what is a "race
relations" case.
[Vol. 21
POLITICAL ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS
Negroes were successful in only 51.3 per cent of the cases."3 The figures
show wide variations from category to category. Decisions were favorable
to Negroes in about 60 per cent of the school cases. In criminal trial pro-
cedures, decisions were favorable in only 11 per cent. This compares with
a 48 per cent success in voting and 17 per cent in employment cases.
The differences in the individual records of the sixty judges are striking.
Thirty-seven judges decided 267 of the 291 cases. Only eighteen of these
judges decided cases favorably to Negroes, with a range of appellate success
of 30-80 per cent. Seven judges handled 43 cases and decided none of
them in favor of Negroes. Nine judges decided 62 cases of which Negroes
won less than 20 per cent. At the other extreme, four judges who handled
35 cases decided in favor of Negroes more than 90 per cent of the time.
Thus, a large proportion of the decisions were made by judges representing
two extremes.
When we turn to the figures for the courts of appeals the striking fact
is the large number of reversals in favor of Negro appellants.64 The dis-
trict courts in the Fifth Circuit decided 51.3 per cent of the cases in favor
of Negroes as against 75.6 per cent in the Fourth Circuit. The Fifth
Circuit reversed about 43 per cent of the appeals. The circuit court de-
cisions favoring Negro litigants consist primarily of reversals of district
court decisions against Negroes. Of the cases reversed, 97 per cent are
in favor of the Negro appellants; of the cases affirmed, 57 per cent are in
favor of the Negro appellants. By way of comparison, less than 5 per cent
of all cases appealed by non-Negro litigants were successful. It must be
remembered that in a great many of the appeals district judges have made
findings of fact and may be reversed only on the clearly erroneous rule
or for abuse of discretion for failing to issue an injunction.
6 For a variety of reasons, such statistics are not completely reliable. Much depends on the
compiler's interpretation. For example, if the court grants partial relief is that to be counted as
favorable or unfavorable? I am certain, however, that a nonstatistical evaluation would show a less
effective judicial performance. For example, was it a victory for desegregation when the court ap-
proved the Atlanta School Board's stairstep program of a grade a year, starting at the twelfth
grade and working down? Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963). It took Hawkins
nine years and three trips to the Supreme Court to gain the right to attend Florida Law School.
State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 47 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1950); 53 So. 2d 116
(Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951); 60 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1952), reversed and remanded,
347 U.S. 971 (1954); 83 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1955), cert. denied, earlier mandate recalled and vacated,
case remanded, 350 U.S. 413 (1956); 93 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1957), cert. denied without prejudice
to seek relief in an appropriate United States District Court, 355 U.S. 839 (1957); 162 F. Supp.
851 (N.D. Fla. 1957), reversed, 253 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1958); 162 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Fla.
1958). By that time thirty-five-year-old Hawkins, out of school for ten years, could not pass the
new admission tests. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS IN PUBLIc HIGHER EDUCATION 1960, 75-79 (1961). Term after term went by before Mere-
dith was admitted to "Ole Miss." See Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 828 (1962). See also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), answering question
certified, 330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963); Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73
YALE L.J. 90, 90-92 (1963). Were these victories for constitutional rights?
4In the period 1954-1962 the southern district courts decided 51.3 per cent of all cases in-
volving negro litigants in favor of negroes. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits, including
those cases decided from eleven southern states, decided 75 per cent in favor of negroes; that of
the Supreme Court was 95.4 per cent. In reversing lower decisions, the circuit courts listed above
decided 96.8 per cent in favor of negroes; the corresponding figure for the Supreme Court was
94.4 per cent. Vines, Courts and Political Change in the South, 22 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 59, 70 (1966).
See also Tables 3, 4, 5 in Vines, The Role of Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial




I draw the following conclusions:
First, it is evident, at least in the deep south states, that many federal
district courts take a more narrow view than the circuit court of their
federal function to bring state and local policy into line with national
policy, especially in civil rights cases involving protection of constitu-
tional rights of individuals against invasions by the state. This is mainly
because of the district courts' front-line exposure to the effects of localism.
I repeat, I do not use the term with any invidious connotation.
Second, in litigation involving federal-state conflicts, the relatively
insulated position of the circuit court and its regional character as a repre-
sentative of six states makes it appropriate that the circuit court bear the
brunt of bringing state or local policy into line with national policy.
This principle would not relieve the district court of responsibility in
cases that clearly call for federal relief, but it tends to protect the local
standing of the district court in the doubtful cases involving an extension
-a logical and proper extension but still an extension-of an accepted
principle of law. In performing our appellate function, our court has had
to resort to a number of forceful measures. We have ordered mandates to
be issued forthwith. We have treated a district court's long non-action
on a motion as a denial of the motion. We have issued injunctions
pending appeals. We issued guidelines for the benefit of school boards
and district courts long before HEW guidelines were issued." There is no
doubt that the necessity of scrutinizing findings of fact and questioning
a trial judge's exercise of discretion involve a danger of improper appellate
intrusion into the proper sphere of a trial court. Both circuit court and
district courts may find themselves on the brink of matters traditionally
beyond their competence." But awareness of this danger should not frus-
trate the performance of the federalizing function.
Third, the relative latitude allowed the circuit court, because of the
dearth of explicit directions it receives from the Supreme Court and be-
cause the circuit court is, in 95 per cent of federal cases, the court of
last resort, increases the importance of its federalizing function independ-
ently of the Supreme Court. For example, contrary to the usual impression,
there are so few Supreme Court decisions on school desegregation that
inferior courts must improvise in dealing with de facto segregated schools,
faculty integration, site selection of schools, and many other problems.
To this extent, the Fifth Circuit is forced into a policy-making position
"'"[W]e hold that HEW's standards are substantially the same as this court's standards."
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd and decree
modified in rehearing en banc, No. 23345, 5th Cir., March 29, 1967.
" The judiciary cannot . . . avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with
whatever difculties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it is brought before
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp what is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the con-
stitution.
Cohens v. Virginia, 22 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 364, 404 (1824).
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as to decisions only tangentially dependent on the Supreme Court. In
the total exercise of our court's function, the civil rights field is only
one among many fields of federal-state conflict and sectional differences
in attitude. The federalizing role is of major importance in labor law,
oil and gas, taxation, agricultural controls, and in many other areas of
the law. To carry out this function effectively, the regional character of
the circuit courts must be preserved. Division of the Fifth Circuit, for
example, would greatly impair the effectiveness of its federalizing function.
Fourth, this nation is undergoing a social revolution with only minor
dislocations of the American federal system. It is far from over. Only in
the last few years have the school boards in the deep south advanced beyond
token desegregation."7 Faculty integration has not started. Non-discrimina-
tory assignment of children, initially, to the first grade or to kindergarten
is just getting started. Thanks to the 1964 Civil Rights Act and to HEW
guidelines there is hope that public schools in the deep south will advance
beyond token desegregation; hope, too, that courts may avoid any close
supervision of public schools. But the country has not yet begun to feel
the impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in housing, employment, or
public accommodations. The full effect of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 may not be felt until 1968 or perhaps 1972 or 1976. In short, the
South may be over the hump, but in fulfilling our historic mission, judges
in this circuit may expect to be busy upsetting lifelong friends.
V.
As Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall clearly foresaw, the central prin-
ciple that makes the American system workable is federal legal supremacy.
This principle preserves national policy against conflicting local policy,
protects the individual's constitutional rights against governmental abuses
of both the nation and the states, and safeguards basic political principles
of American federalism. The voting-rights cases illustrate these three
aspects of federal legal supremacy. The protection that federal courts
afford to Negro voters as a class carries out national policy, gives effect to
the individual Negro's right to vote under the fifteenth amendment, and
supports the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of govern-
ment by insuring Negro participation in the electoral process.
Considering the long denial of civil rights to Negroes under color of
67 In 1965 there was no faculty desegregation in any of these school districts; indeed, none of
the 30,500 Negro teachers in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi served with any of the 65,400
white teachers in those states. In the 1963-1964 school year, the eleven states of the Confederacy
had 1.17 per cent of their Negro students in schools with white students. In 1964-1965, un-
doubtedly because of the effect of the 1964 act, the percentage doubled, reaching 2.25. For the
1965-1966 school year, this time because of HEW guidelines, the percentage reached 6.01. In
1965-1966 the entire region encompassing the southern and border states had 10.9 per cent of
their Negro children in schools with white children; 1,555 biracial school districts out of 3,031
in the southern and border states were still fully segregated; 3,101,043 Negro children in the region
attended all-Negro schools. Despite the impetus of the 1964 act, the states of Alabama, Louisiana,
and Mississippi still had less than one per cent of their Negro enrollment attending schools with
white students. SOUTHERN EDUCATION REPORTING SERVICE, STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Dec. 1965),
cited in UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-1966, 1 (1966).
1967]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
law and their slow march through the courts to reify equality before the
law, a monument should be erected to patient Negro plaintiffs who never
lost faith in the federal court as the proper place for solution of racial
problems. Unfortunately many Negroes suffering from vestigial disabili-
ties of slavery still stand and wait in front of closed doors. Their patience
wears thin. If their grievances are to be settled in courthouses, not in
streets, our federal courts must be accessible. And federal judges must
perform firmly and fully their historic, destined, if friction-making,
exacerbating political role."
68 So there may be no misunderstanding as to my position with regard to the place of states
in American federalism, I quote from a recent opinion:
The concept of the States as political bodies rather than administrative units of the
national government tends to fractionalize power, preserve regional differences, en-
courage home rule, and promote democracy at all levels of government. These charac-
teristics of American federalism are essential to the kind of government I want to live
under. . . . 'States' Rights' are mystical, emotion-laden words. For me, as for most
Southerners, the words evoke visions of the hearth and defense of the homeland and
carry the sound of bugles and the beat of drums. But the crowning glory of American
federalism is not States' Rights. It is the protection the United States Constitution
gives to the private citizen against all wrongful governmental invasion of fundamental
rights and freedoms.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 570 (E.D. La. 1964) (Wisdom, J., dissenting opinion),
rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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